Academic Papers & Grants


Outline: In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe in concrete cases of doxastic deliberation. I also survey some of the recent literature on this debate.

Outline: In my thesis, I survey much of the ‘aim of belief’ literature. I argue against teleological and normative theories of belief, and I defend a functional account. The functional account that I defend makes extensive use of systemic functions, and fits broadly into a functionalist theory of the mind. I also briefly consider how these theories can be extended to account of suspended belief–again I defend a functional account.

Scholarship: My Ph.D. thesis was supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong. The duration of the scholarship was 2014-2017, and the award totalled 720,000 HKD.


Works in Progress

Outline: The purpose of this project is to consider how (and whether) teleological and normative theories of belief can explain the nature and normatively of suspended belief (suspension). I argue that recent attempts to extend these theories to account for suspension fail. This suggests that we must either abandon the assumption that theories of belief ought to account for suspension, or we must develop different theories of belief that can account for suspension.

If these papers interest you, please feel free to send me any comments that you might have. My email address is: